



Methods for the Safety Assurance of Perception DNNs in AD An Overview

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
Background: Project KI-Absicherung

Vision

KI Absicherung makes the **safety of AI-based function modules** for **highly automated driving provable**.

Use-case

Camera/LiDAR based single frame **pedestrian detection**



see also <https://www.ki-absicherung.vdali.de>

Agenda

1	Background: Safety for AI	4
2	Categorizing Methods for Safety Assurance	7
3	Examples of Safety Assurance Methods	15
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Automotive Safety Basics

Safety

Def. Safety

means *absence of unreasonable risk* due to

- malfunction (ISO 26262-1, 3.132)
- intended functionality
(foreseeable misuse, performance limitation wrt. environment)
(ISO/PAS 21448)

← [...] according to valid societal moral concepts (ISO 26262-1, 3.176)

Rating safety:

Safety Integrity Levels (ISO 26262-3, 6.4.3) derived from

- › Probability
- › Severity
- › Controllability

Automotive Safety Basics

Safety Case

Def.: Safety Case


is a documented body of *evidence* providing convincing and valid *argument* that a system is adequately safe for a *given application* in a *given environment*

Arguments may be

- Deterministic
- Probabilistic
- Qualitative(!)

Evidence types:

- Design & process
 - System level
 - Unit level
- Verification
- (Experience)



(Bishop and Bloomfield 1998)


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2.1	Goal: Safety Concerns	8
2.2	What: Target of Change	11
2.3	When: Life-cycle	13
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
What is mitigated? Safety Requirements



Def.: DNN-specific Safety Concern

underlying issues of AI-based perception which may negatively affect the safety of a system


e.g., snow



→ Treat all possible combinations!

see also <https://www.ki-absicherung.vdali.de>; (Willers et al. 2020) Fig. 1

What is mitigated? Safety Concerns



AI Specifics

- › Unreliable **confidence** information
- › **Brittleness** (e.g. against perturbations, lack of temporal stability)
- › **Incomprehensible** behavior
- › Insufficient **plausibility**

Data

- › Labeling **quality** (e.g. wrong/missing (meta-)labels)
- › Train/test data **separation**
- › **Representativity**
- › Inadequate **ODD** spec.
- › **Distributional shift** over time
- › Unknown behavior in **rare critical situations**

Metrics

- › Safety relevant metric


Others

- › Lack of algorithmic efficiency (e.g. memory use, power consumption, frames/second)

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What is changed?



Mechanisms during creation
Specification & guidelines for:

- DNN design
- **Dataset** collection
- **Training**

Mechanisms on system level
Detect & prevent at:

Input
Internal state
Output

Verification

- Testing
- (Semi-)formal
- Inspect **via proxy**

Validation
via traditional validation testing (e.g. endurance run)

Ensure test data representativity
cover:



- Experience
- Semantic features
- Learned features**

(Schwalbe et al. 2020)

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When is it applied?



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Validation of an Evidence Method

- › *For verification in general:* Method for obtaining evidences is ...
 - › **Appropriate** (theoretically measures what is needed)
 - › **Known** to work
 - › **Applicable** / correctly applied

- › *For performance claims:*
 - › Correct metrics & **deduction**
 - › Statistical **significance** wrt. claim
 - › Representative **test data**
 - › Appropriate ML **model**
 - › Assumptions on **environment** and surrounding **system**

Creation

Training Data Optimization (Shorten and Khoshgoftaar 2019)

- › **Dataset diversity:** *e.g.*,
 - › Image manipulation
 - › Addition of artifacts *cf.* (Zendel et al. 2015)
 - › Domain randomization
 - › Synthetic data generation / augmentation
 - › Counterexample generation (Dreossi et al. 2018)
- › **Image selection:** *e.g.*, Active learning
- › Other topics: Label quality, data representativity & fidelity

(Eykholt et al. 2018, Tab. 1)




“speed limit 45”



(Geirhos et al. 2019), Fig. 1

(Guo et al. 2018, Fig. 1, p. 2)



Creation

Architecture and Training Objective

- › Explainable intermediate output, e.g.

- › Concept Bottlenecks

(Losch et al. 2020), (Koh et al. 2020)


- › Attention heatmaps



(Kim and Canny 2017), Fig. 5

- › Soft training constraints, e.g.

- › Hierarchical (Roychowdhury, Diligenti, and Gori 2018)




- › Locality of activations

- › Robustness against perturbations

- › Temporal Consistency (Varghese et al. 2021)

- › Proper uncertainty output, e.g. via

- › Ensembling
 - › Bayesian DNNs




(Kendall & Gal 2017, Fig. 1, p. 2)

Offline Verification

Quantitative Explainable AI

“Attention” heatmap-methods for plausibility checks, e.g.

- › White-box (gradients, relevance back-propagation, ...)
- › Black-box (occlusion based, perturbation based ...)



(Kindermans et al. 2018), Fig. 6

Knowledge V&V by disentanglement of internal semantics


- › Mining of learned concepts
(Ge et al. 2021), (Zhang et al. 2021), (Esser et al. 2020)



(Olah et al. 2017), Fig. 5

- › Interpretable proxy models

- › Properties of learned concepts (e.g., similarity)
(Fong and Vedaldi 2018), (Schwalbe and Schels 2020)



(Hohman et al. 2020), Fig. 2

Offline Verification

Formal Methods


Formal verification

- › **Goals:** Find
 - › counterexamples
 - › validity range
 - › reachable set


- › **Methods Examples:**

layer-by-layer reachability /
boundary estimation,
(constrained) optimization,
search,
solvers

(Liu et al. 2019), Fig. 2



(c) Reachability result.



(Formal) Testing


- › **Goals:**
 - › Semantic coverage e.g. via SDL & sampler
 - › Latent space coverage (direct & indirect)

- › **Methods Examples:**

Differential (Pei et al. 2017),
fuzzy (Odena et al. 2019),
concolic (Sun et al. 2018)

Online Verification: System level measures


- › Input filtering (Ilyas et al. 2019), (Kapoor et al. 2020)
- › Redundancy & voting
- › Monitoring for
 - › Out-of-distribution, *e.g.*, via
 - › Uncertainty estimation
 - › Plausibility / consistency with constraints, *e.g.*,
 - › Temporal consistency (Varghese et al. 2020)
 - › Local stability
 - › Semantic constraints on outputs (Schwalbe 2021), (Giunchiglia et al. 2022)
- › Error handling, *e.g.*, via removal, correction, additional queries, ...



Offline Verification

Example: Explainable AI to Verify Logical Constraints

3 Evaluate on new samples



Original & predictions



Concept outputs



$F(p)$



(Schwalbe et al. 2022)

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Conclusion

Technologies involved in safety assurance are **highly diverse**

Categories: Goal? Target element? When (in lifecycle)?

- › Creation (“build it right”)
- › V&V (“check it right”)
- › System design (“prevent / mitigate failing in op”)

To provide convincing evidence method must be **applicable, appropriate, known to work**; results documented

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